We compile a new database of grocery prices in Argentina, with over 9 million observations per day. Our main novel inding is that product prices almost do not vary within stores of a chain (i.e., uniform pricing). We also ind that prices do not change signiicantly with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so for chains that operate in many regions. To study the impact of uniform pricing on both consumers and irms, this paper uses a tractable model based on the trade literature. Motivated by our empirical indings, each irm has to set the same price in both regions. Relative to a counterfactual in which irms can set diferent prices across regions (i.e., lexible pricing), uniform pricing reduces irms' proits by 0.4%. Consumers, however, prefer uniform pricing and are willing to give up 6.7% of their income to avoid lexible pricing in the baseline model. he efect on consumers, however, depends on how much uniform pricing limits irms' power to extract consumer surplus and how heterogeneous the regions are.
Introduction
Price dispersion is known to be a prevalent characteristic in many markets of developed countries with low inlation: he same product is sold at diferent prices by various stores in the same regional market and time period. his paper makes two main contributions. First, we introduce a new dataset of grocery store prices in Argentina and conirm that large variation in prices is also present in this developing country with high inlation. Our second main contribution is to highlight, however, that conditional on a product, there is litle variation in prices across stores of the same chain; i.e., there is uniform pricing. Prices almost do not vary within stores of a chain and prices do not change signiicantly with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so for chains that operate in many regions. Using a simple two-region model, we show that uniform pricing, relative to a counterfactual in which irms can set diferent prices in each region, has non-trivial implications for irms' proits and consumers' welfare.
Most empirical analysis about micro-price statistics use scanner price data from developed countries with low inlation. We complement this literature by creating a new database for daily prices of grocery stores in Argentina in a high-inlation context. Since May 2016, every day, stores have to report their oline prices (i.e., prices in the store) to the government. he data is processed and posted online in an oicial price-comparison website, with the objective of providing information to consumers. One of this paper's contributions is the compilation of high-frequency price data from a developing country in a high-inlation (about 30% in 2016) regime. We have about 9 million price observations per day, totaling about 5 billion observations, which allows us to have a large panel on chains, stores, products, and prices.
Our main novel inding is that chains, rather than stores, explain most of the price variation. In other words, prices almost do not vary between particular store locations of a chain (i.e., uniform pricing). his paper presents three pieces of evidence consistent with this fact. First, even though chains have on average over 100 stores across the country, we ind that there are on average less than 4 unique prices per product per chain. Second, price changes are also consistent with uniform pricing. Focusing on products that change prices in one store, we compute the probability that other stores change the prices of the same products on the same day. he probability is 5% for stores of any chain, but it increases to almost 30% when we focus on stores of the same chain. If we focus only on stores in the same province within the chain, this share increases to almost 65%. 1 hird, using a variance decomposition methodology, we ind that around two-thirds of the relative price dispersion can be explained by chainproduct ixed efects. 2 Hence, only one-third of the price variation can be explained by stores seting diferent prices within a chain.
1
We complement the analysis with information on the location of stores with 2010 Census data in order to study how uniform pricing relates to the characteristics (e.g., education or employment) of each chain's locations. Even though chains with many and more heterogeneous stores tend to display less uniform pricing, we ind that the most powerful explanatory variable of uniform pricing seems to be the number of provinces in which a chain operates. Nevertheless, the number of unique prices per product per chain, one measure of uniform pricing, increases by less than one-to-one with the number of provinces in which a chain operates.
One potential implication of uniform pricing is that grocery store prices would not change with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so if chains operate in several regions. We test this hypothesis using monthly employment data at the province level. We show that prices in stores of chains that operate in many regions do not seem to react to local labor market conditions, while stores of chains operating almost exclusively in one region do react to local conditions. Finally, this paper uses a tractable trade model based on Simonovska (2015) , to study the impact of uniform pricing on both consumers and irms and to compare the efects of regional and aggregate income shocks. he model features two regions and a continuum of goods sold by monopolistically competitive irms. Motivated by our indings, each irm has to set a single price in both regions. Consumers have non-homothetic preferences so that regional income shocks can afect prices. Consumers from each region have diferent preferences over goods so that goods have heterogeneous market shares in each region. We estimate the model to match the fact that irms that operate mostly in one region will react more to local shocks.
Uniform pricing implies that consumption reacts less in response to an aggregate than to a regional income shock because prices adjust more in response to aggregate shocks. he estimated model predicts an almost one-third larger elasticity of consumption to a regional income shock than to an aggregate one. his result highlights that some caution may be necessary when using regional shocks to estimate aggregate elasticities, particularly when the relevant prices are set uniformly across regions.
Comparing our baseline model of uniform pricing to a counterfactual in which irms can set diferent prices in each region (i.e., lexible pricing), we ind that uniform pricing generally reduces irms' proits by 0.4 in our baseline model. Consumers, however, prefer uniform pricing and are willing to give up 6.7 of their income to avoid lexible pricing in the baseline model. here are two main opposing forces behind this result, and their relative importance depends on several model assumptions. On the one hand, uniform pricing limits irms' power to extract consumer surplus. Given the preference heterogeneity across regions, uniform pricing reduces the power of irms to extract surplus from the consumers who like their products the most, as there is another region in which consumers may not like their products as much. On the other hand, if regions have diferent levels of income, uniform pricing increases consumption inequality. Firms will set prices as if they had a consumer with an income equal to a weighted average of the two regions' incomes, hence leading to higher (lower) prices for the poor (rich) region than under lexible pricing. Finally, given this efect on prices, we evaluate the implications of uniform pricing for the efect of regional income shocks on consumers' welfare. Under lexible pricing, prices would be reduced when income falls. his price reduction, however, is not as salient when there can be only one price for both regions, thus leading to a larger decrease in consumption under uniform than lexible pricing. We interpret this inding to mean that the efect of regional business cycles on consumption may be ampliied by uniform pricing.
he rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 introduces our novel price dataset and provides basic descriptive statistics. Section 4 provides our main empirical results regarding uniform pricing. he model and the implications of uniform pricing for consumers and irms are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes. he Appendices contain additional details on the data and model.
Related Literature
his paper is related to the empirical literature on price-seting behavior in high-inlation countries. Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Neumeyer (2018) also study micro-price statistics for Argentina, but in a diferent period (1988 to 1997) and with a smaller sample. 3 Diferent from previous research, we have larger cross-sectional variation in stores and products, which allows us to control for observable characteristics and uncover novel empirical facts. For example, in Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Neumeyer (2018) the average number of observations per month is about 81,000, whereas we have about 9 million observations per day. Similarly, they have information on 500 products, whereas we have four times as many products in our inal sample selection. 4 his paper is also related to the empirical literature about gathering new data on retail prices in developing countries. Cavallo and Rigobon (2016) provide a summary of this new research agenda. Our contribution is that we obtain information on oline prices (i.e., in the store) instead of online prices as in previous research. Since February 2016, the Argentinean government has created a daily, national, publicly available report of prices (Sistema Electronico de Publicidad de Precios Argentinos). To the best of our knowledge, we are the irst to collect and analyze this data. his paper is part of a growing literature that studies price dispersion. Cavallo (2018) and Jo, Matsumura, and Weinstein (2018) highlight a new type of price convergence due to e-commerce. E-retailers typically have a single-price or uniform-pricing strategy independent of the buyer's location. Jo, Matsumura, and Weinstein (2018) show that the introduction of Rakuten (the largest Japanese e-retailer) has led to a reduction in price diferentials between Japanese oline retailers (of potentially many chains). In the US, Cavallo (2018) shows that the introduction of Amazon has led to a reduction in price diferentials as well, but his focus is on price dispersion within locations of a single chain (i.e., Walmart). Empirical studies ind that many store characteristics are explained by chains. For example, Hwang, Bronnenberg, and homadsen (2010) ind that assortment gets set at the chain level, and Hwang and homadsen (2016) ind that a large fraction of the variation of brand sales across stores is also explained at the chain level. We extend the evidence showing that also prices seem to be deined at the chain level. Our empirical indings about price dispersion are more closely related to the analysis in Nakamura, Nakamura, and Nakamura (2011) and Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (Forthcoming) for the US. Previous papers used scanner price data, which has the disadvantages of being at weekly frequency and of using transaction prices that mix temporary sales with list prices. A distinct feature of our data is that we observe daily list prices, which allow us to get a more precise deinition of prices. Similar to Nakamura, Nakamura, and Nakamura (2011), we ind evidence of a large chain component in price seting. Cavallo, Neiman, and Rigobon (2014) highlight that only 21 out of the top 70 US retailers (among those that sell online) potentially have prices that vary by ZIP code, and 13 of these 21 are grocery stores. We show that, at least in the case of Argentina, the price variation between grocery stores of the same chain is relatively small. 5
Our paper also relates to a growing literature that estimates various elasticities with respect to regional shocks (e.g., Mian and Sui, 2011; Sui, Mian, and Rao, 2013; Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina, 2016; Yagan, 2018; Sergeyev and Mehrotra, 2018) . We contribute to this literature by exploring the impact of uniform pricing policies on the impact regional shocks have on consumers and irms. Using US data, DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2017) estimate a constant-elasticity model of demand and ind that the average chain could increase its proits by 7% under lexible pricing. We build and estimate a tractable two-region model based on the trade literature (Simonovska, 2015) to evaluate the impact on irms and consumers. Diferently from DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2017), our structural model allows us to take into account changes in demand elasticity when evaluating the impact of uniform pricing. Similar to Adams and Williams (2019), we ind that uniform pricing generally leads to higher consumer welfare since it partially protects consumers from irms exercising monopolistic power. In addition to this market power force highlighted by Adams and Williams (2019) , however, in our model this welfare result depends on how diferent the regions are and the magnitude of the local shocks. Uniform pricing implies that irms do not reduce prices as much when productivity is reduced in a region, and, hence, if local shocks are sizable, uniform pricing may actually reduce consumer welfare.
Data
In February 2016, the Argentinean government passed a normative to build a national, publicly available report of prices (Sistema Electronico de Publicidad de Precios Argentinos). he objective of the policy was to reduce inlation by providing information on prices. All large retailers of massively consumed goods have to report daily prices to the government for each of their stores. he requirement was mandatory for a large set of products (typically associated with grocery stores), but retailers were allowed to include non-mandatory products as well. Large ines (of up to 3 million US dollars) are to be applied if stores do not report their prices correctly. Since May 2016, the oicial website www.preciosclaros.gob.
ar has provided consumer-friendly access to this price information. On this website, ater entering their location, consumers can search for stores and products and compare current prices. his website only contains information about the prices in the stores; i.e., consumers cannot buy online from this website. In this paper, we use data from May 2016 to March 2018. 6 We obtain information on each store and product. For each store, we know its name (not just an identiication code), its chain owner, the type of store, and its precise location (latitude and longitude). Chains may have diferent types of stores due to having alternative sizes of stores, or due to being known under diferent names in the market. We do not know whether these diferent types of stores operate as diferent chains, so in some of our analysis we deine "chains" as "chain-types". For each product (bar code), we know its name, category, and brand. Categories are composed of three levels, with the third level being the most disaggregated. For example, the irst-level categories include personal care and non-alcoholic drinks. he second level of the personal care category includes hair care and oral care. Finally, two examples within the third level of hair care are shampoos and conditioners.
he prices posted on the website are the prices of products available at each (oline) store. Given that some products have special sales, we sometimes have several prices for a good in a particular store on a given day. In such cases, we know all available prices. Some of these sales are available only to some consumers-typically a percentage discount for customers with a particular credit card or membership. Some of these sales, however, also refer to discounts available to all consumers-for example, two for the price of one. In addition to the mandatory list price, each store can report one of each of these two types of sale prices. We can diferentiate these two types of sales, so we end up with a maximum of three prices per product-store-day. 7 Overall, we have daily data on approximately 9 million product-store observations across the country.
Our dataset has advantages and disadvantages relative to more common scanner price data. here are two main disadvantages. We do not observe prices for grocery stores that are not part of large companies (i.e., those with annual sales over approximately 50 million US dollars). According to survey information available for 2012-2013 (Encuesta Nacional de Gastos de Hogares), our data should include between 50 and 85% of grocery sales in Argentina. In that year, grocery sales corresponded to approximately 33% of households' expenditures. More importantly, we do not have purchase quantities or individual product weights. herefore, our empirical analysis assigns equal weight to each product-store included in the analysis.
Balancing these disadvantages, this data has several advantages. First, scanner price data is not easily available in developing countries, so our data helps ill this gap. Also, because Argentina is a highinlation (about 30% in 2016) country it provides an interesting scenario. Moreover, having daily (instead of weekly or monthly) price data for all products (not just the ones being sold or bought) is an advantage. Knowing each store's chain provides us with new information that has not been widely exploited before. Similarly, our data has precise location information on each store (not just zip codes), so it potentially allows us to create interesting measures of distance to competition, among others. Finally, we are able to identify both the list price and (possibly many) sales prices, which can be important when describing retailers' pricing strategies. Figure 1 shows all the stores included in the data. Given that most stores are concentrated in the Buenos Aires area, the two botom igures show in more detail Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) and Buenos Aires City (CABA). 8 We irst describe prices in a particular local market, CABA, and then study the pricing evidence from all stores in Argentina. 9 he data includes 2313 stores of 22 chains, with around 50 thousand products. his implies about 9 millions product-store observations per day for 584 days, totaling about 5 billion observations. In order to study price dispersion, we limit our atention to products that are widely sold, as is common in the literature (e.g., Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter, Forthcoming) . In particular, we clean the data such that we keep products that are sold by at least two chains and are present in more than 50% of stores in a given region (i.e., either CABA or Argentina). We also focus on products that are sold most of the time (i.e., we focus on product-store combinations present in over 50% of the weeks). We also drop products in the price-control program Precios Cuidados as there is no dispersion on these prices. 10 Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the data before and ater cleaning, for CABA and Argentina. he data cleaning process does not eliminate any store. Even though it does reduce the number of products studied by around 90-95%, the number of observations is reduced by only two- 8 Argentina has a population of approximately 44 million people. GBA and CABA account for approximately one-third and one-tenth of the country's population, respectively. he areas of GBA and CABA are 3,830 and 203 km 2 , respectively. As a reference, CABA is about twice as large as Manhatan, both in population and area. 9 Results are robust to choosing other cities (e.g., Cordoba). 10 he program Precios Cuidados consists of price controls for about 300 products. See Aparicio and Cavallo (2018) for a study of this program. thirds. he products kept are the ones more common across stores, and hence have a larger number of observations. 11 he number of stores per product increases by around 500%, hence allowing us to have enough information to describe price dispersion. Finally, the average prices of the products are around 25% lower in the selected sample. More importantly, the average price dispersion-the cross-sectional standard deviation of the prices at which the same product is sold on the same day and in the same region-in the initial and inal samples remains almost constant. Finally, we use the stores' locations to include two additional data sources. First, we use the the 2010 Census to incorporate characteristics such as education and employment of each store's location. Second, we use oicial data on regional employment to study the response of prices to local shocks. 12
Descriptive Statistics

Empirical Results
In this section we study the role of chains (as opposed to stores) on prices. Recent literature has highlighted that price dispersion is a prevalent characteristic in many markets: he same product (deined by the UPC bar code) is sold at diferent prices by various stores in a local market and time period. We also ind large variation in relative prices between chains. We ind, however, that conditional on a product, there is litle variation across stores of the same chain. We use the term "uniform pricing" to refer to this fact, i.e., that product prices do not vary within stores of a chain. he geographic boundary of a chain is not obvious, so we perform our analysis both using only Buenos Aires city data and using all Argentinean data. In both cases, we show that prices as well as price changes are remarkably similar for all stores within a chain.
We then introduce information on the characteristics of store locations and explore which chain characteristics correlate more with uniform pricing. Even though chains with a larger number of stores or with stores in very diferent locations tend to display less uniform pricing, we ind that the most important determinant of uniform pricing is the number of provinces in which a chain operates. Nevertheless, the number of unique prices per product per chain, one measure of uniform pricing, increases by less than one-to-one with the number of provinces in which a chain operates.
One potential implication of uniform pricing is that grocery store prices would not change with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so if chains operate in several regions. We explore this hypothesis and show that prices in stores of chains that operate in many regions do not seem to react to local labor market conditions, while stores of chains operating almost exclusively in one region do react to local conditions.
Uniform Pricing
CABA has 806 grocery stores that belong to 5 diferent chains. he number of stores per chain varies between 17 and 340. he size of the stores, measured by the number of products sold, also varies between approximately 1,200 and 1,800. To obtain some intuition about prices within chains, we irst use a case study of a particular product (a speciic carbonated soda identiied by the EAN code) in a particular day (December 1st, 2016) . Figure 2 shows the distribution of prices for this product, with diferent colors identifying the distribution of each chains. Prices are bunched in only a few values and, more importantly, conditional on a chain, there are only a few prices (much fewer prices than the number of stores). 13
13 Appendix Figure A2 repeats this exercise for other products. More formally, Table 2 shows that uniform pricing is a general characteristic of chains in CABA. For each day and product, we deine the relative price as the log-price minus the mean log-price across stores for the same product. Product prices are almost unique within chains. he average number of unique prices for each good across stores is between 1 and 4.5 for all chains. Given the number of stores per chain, this implies one price per 55 stores on average. Chains have up to 4 types of stores, and part of the price dispersion within chains is explained by price diferences between store types. he average number of unique prices by chain-type is always under 3, implying one price per 81 stores. Moreover, price dispersion in CABA is 7% (see Table 1 ), while price dispersion within chains is smaller, between 0.7% and 4.7%. If we further control for store type within chains, the price dispersion is even smaller.
he last panel of Table 2 refers to the average price of each chain. he relative price of a store is deined as the average relative price across products in the store for a given day. he relative price of the chain is deined as the average across time and stores of these daily relative prices. Chain I is in general the cheapest, with a relative price 3.3% lower than the average. his contrasts signiicantly with the Chain V relative price, which is 3.2% higher than the average. his ranking, however, hides signiicant variation across products. For example, the cheapest chain sets 5% of their prices 4.3% above the market average. Similarly, the most expensive chain sets 5% of their prices 10.6% below the market average. Table 3 expands this analysis to all the chains and stores in Argentina, showing that product prices are almost unique within chains not only in CABA but in all Argentina. In order to understand the magnitude, we highlight that the average number of stores per chain is over 100. he geographic boundary of a chain is not clear, so we remark that for most multi-province chains the average number of unique prices is much smaller if we compute unique prices by chain-province. 14 Unique prices by product 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.11 3.73 1.00 9.08 1.00 3.44 1. Unique prices by product 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 2.72 1.00 2.10 1.00 2.74 1.13 1.40 1. Unique prices by product 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.09 2.72 1.00 1.32 1.00 2.17 1.09 1.04 1. Notes: Price dispersion refers to the average standard deviation of log-standardized prices. his measure is explained in detail in the main text. Notes: Statistics are in daily frequency. For example, 2.65% of prices are changed everyday in CABA. "Price changes by store" refers to the share of prices that were changed by stores that changed the price of at least one product.
Price Changes: Table 4 studies the intensive and extensive margin of price changes in CABA and Argentina, highlighting the large level of synchronization in price changes across stores of the same chain. Around 2.8% of prices are changed every day, with approximately two-third of these changes being price increases and one-third being decreases. Midrigan (2011) highlights that price changes tend to occur at similar times for products of the same category in the US. his is also true in our data. Among products that change prices in CABA, only 13% of other stores in any chain change prices. For products that change prices, we observe that around 27% of other products in the same level-3 category (the most narrowly deined) change prices in the same store. We notice, however, that price-change coordination seems stronger across chains than categories. Among products that change prices, we observe that 30-37% of other stores in the same chain change the price of the same product in the same day. he standard deviation of these price changes is approximately one-sixth of the unconditional standard deviation of price changes. Moreover, if we focus only on stores of the same type (for CABA) or in same province (for Argentina) within the chain, the share of stores that change prices increases to over 60%, with an even smaller dispersion of changes. his evidence suggests that chains coordinate their price changes across stores.
Variance decomposition: In Appendix B we introduce a statistical model to perform a variance decomposition of prices and formally highlight the role of chains in pricing. Figure 3 shows that in CABA, 15% of the price variation is driven by some chains being generally more expensive than others. Once we control for average prices of products by chain, 73% (15% + 58%) of the price dispersion is explained. Similarly for Argentina, average chain prices per product explain 62% (10% + 52%) of price variation. Controlling for price diferences across provinces by chain explains another 19%. In other words, consistent with Table 2 and 3, price variation across stores within chains is small, driving only 27% and 19% of the total relative price dispersion for CABA and Argentina, respectively. 
Correlation with Chain Characteristics
We merge information on the location of stores with 2010 Census data to describe the characteristics of each chain's locations. We use the most precise deinition of a location in the Census data (i.e., departamentos, partidos or comunas, depending on the region), with a total of 528 locations. hese locations are generally large, on average 7,300km 2 in size with a population of 79,000 people. he median location in which stores are located, however, is smaller in size and more densely populated (186 km 2 with 190,000 people). 15 More importantly, we are able to obtain information on the education, employment and home characteristics of the people living in those areas. Table 5 performs a simple OLS regression of our diferent measures of uniform pricing on diferent chain characteristics. he number of unique prices increases with the number of stores, but this becomes insigniicant once we control for the number of provinces in which a chain operates. One potential hypothesis is that chains with greater variance in store location characteristics will have higher incen- 15 Means are approximately 3,W500km 2 and 310,000 individuals. 14 tives to set diferent prices. We ind that the the number of unique prices does increase with variance in store location characteristics (either education or distance to competition) but, once again, becomes insigniicant once we control for the number of provinces in which a chain operates. he second panel of Table 5 shows that the results are qualitatively similar if we use the standard deviation of relative prices as the measure of dispersion instead of the number of unique prices. he let panel of Figure 4 plots the relation between uniform pricing and the number of provinces in which a chain operates. he relation is positive but lower than one-to-one. he number of stores, shown by the size of each circle, does not seem to afect the number of unique prices. he right panel of Figure  4 plots the same relation but deines chains in a more strict way, i.e., according to chain-types. In this case, the relation between uniform pricing and the number of provinces becomes weaker, suggesting that chains may use subdivisions within the chain to partially discriminate prices. Once that is done, price diferentiation between locations is not as strong. Store locations are not exogenous, so we might expect that chains tend to operate stores in locations with similar characteristics (e.g., for reputation or customer demand reasons). To study this hypothesis, we compute the variance of the log of alternative characteristics for locations in which a chain operates relative to the unconditional variance. Table 6 shows that the averages across chains for alternative characteristics (e.g., education, number of children, or age of the head of household) are always under one-half, conirming that chains locate their stores in relatively similar places.
Efects of Regional Shocks
We have reported consistent evidence that irms' pricing decisions almost do not vary with store characteristics; that is most chains tend to have a single price per product across their stores. One potential implication of this fact is that grocery store pricing will not change with local conditions or shocks.
In this section we introduce evidence on monthly employment levels for each province to evaluate whether average store prices luctuate with local labor market conditions. 16
Given the evidence presented on uniform pricing, we expect that prices in stores of chains that operate in many regions will not react to local labor market conditions, while stores of chains operating almost exclusively in one region will react to local conditions. For each store s we deine three measures. First, for prices, let ∆p s,t be the annual change in the average relative price in store s and month t. Second, we measure the relative importance of a province for a chain with the local share. Let c(s) refer to the chain of store s and prov(s) the province of store s. We deine the chain's local share local s,t as the share of stores of chain c(s) that belong to province prov(s) in month t. hird, for local conditions, let ∆e prov(s),t be the annual change in log employment in the province prov(s) of store s in month t. Table 7 evaluates how ∆p s,t relates to ∆e prov(s),t and, more importantly, how that relation depends on the local share local s,t .
he irst column of Table 7 shows that average-price growth per store is not signiicantly related to employment growth. In all our analysis, we control for store ixed efects in order to control for trends in either store or local characteristics. Once we split the sample by local share, however, columns (2) and (3) show that the relation is signiicantly positive for stores with a local share above the median (i.e., above one-third approximately) but not for those below.
Next, we do a more formal analysis of the role of the local share by including the interaction between local s,t and ∆e prov(s),t . We estimate ∆p s,t = α s + γ t + δ local s,t + ρ ∆e prov(s),t + β local s,t × ∆e prov(s),t + ϵ s,t .
he coeicient of interest is the interaction term β . Columns (4) and (5) show that the interaction term is signiicant and positive, even ater controlling for time ixed efects. Figure 5 plots the marginal efect of employment growth ∆e prov(s),t on store price growth ∆p s,t for store with diferent levels of local shares local s,t , showing that prices in stores with larger local shares covary more with local conditions. his means that a 1 percent change in employment growth (∆e prov(s),t ) implies a 0.5 percent change in prices (∆p s,t ) for chains with a local share of 100%, but almost no change for chains with a local share below 25%. Notes: his igure reports the marginal efect of employment growth on price growth for diferent levels of a chain's local share, as obtained from Column (4) in Table 7 . he vertical lines refer to the 95% conidence intervals.
18
We build and estimate a tractable model consistent with our empirical indings to evaluate the consequences of uniform pricing. We compare the responses of prices and quantities for regional versus aggregate shocks and study who are the winners and losers of uniform pricing. he model has the minimal ingredients such that it is consistent with the data and is also tractable, allowing us to easily identify the key trade-ofs across alternative pricing schemes. We describe the main ingredients of the model and relegate the solution details to Appendix C.
Time is discrete and ininite, t = 0, . . . , ∞. here are two cities j = 1, 2 and a continuum of diferentiated goods ω ∈ [0, 1]. Each product is sold by a national monopolistic irm that chooses to sell in either one or both cities. hroughout the analysis, we interpret city 1 as the local economy and city 2 as the rest of the economy. We take wages as given, but each product market ω clears. Section 6.6 extends the analysis to a general equilibrium framework.
Households
here is a representative consumer in each city with period utility
where Ω j,t is the set of goods consumed in city j and period t, q j,t (ω) is the individual consumption of variety ω in city j and period t, andq j > 0 is a city-speciic constant. here are city-speciic tastes, s j (ω), such that the demand functions are heterogeneous across goods and cities. We assume that ∂s 1 (ω) ∂ω ≥ 0 and ∂s 2 (ω) ∂ω ≤ 0. Hence, city j = 1 prefers goods closer to ω = 1, while city j = 2 prefers goods close to ω = 0.
Preferences are non-homothetic, so the demand elasticity changes with income, as in Simonovska (2015). We assume these preferences so that the model can be consistent with the empirical indings in Section 4 showing that prices change with income shocks. 17 Moreover, the presence of heterogeneous tastes and non-homotheticity implies that in equilibrium some goods are sold only in city 1, some goods only in city 2, and some in both cities. his characterization is important to capture the empirical inding that some chains are national (i.e., sell in many cities), while others are local (sell only in one city) and can have diferent responses to regional shocks.
he representative household has an exogenous labor supply normalized to L j,t . he household's prob-lem reads
he demand for variety ω in city j at period t is given by
where y j,t = w j,t L j,t ,S j,t = ∫ ω∈Ω j,t s j (ω) dω, and P j,t = ∫ ω∈Ω j,t p j,t (ω) dω. he marginal utility from consuming a variety ω is bounded from above at any level of consumption. Hence, a consumer may not have positive demand for all varieties.
Firms
Firms have a linear technology in local labor to produce goods in each city. he cost of producing one unit of good in city j in period t is c j,t =
We compare the solution of two alternative price setings: uniform and lexible pricing. Under uniform pricing, the irm has to set the same price in both cities; i.e., p 1,t (ω) = p 2,t (ω) = p t (ω). Alternatively, under lexible pricing, producers can set diferent prices in each city.
Flexible Pricing
In the case of lexible pricing, irms can set diferent prices in each city. he problem of the irm is
taking the demand function 2 as given. he solution is
Given the demand function 2 and pricing 3, we can ind the set of goods consumed in each city. It is easy to show that this set is characterized by a threshold such that q j,t (ω) ≥ 0 if and only if s j (ω) ≥ s j,t . 18
18 To see this, replace the equilibrium price 3 on the demand function 2 and note that it is increasing in s j (ω).
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he threshold is deined as the taste such that consumption is equal to zero; that is s j,t ≡ S j,t q j c j,t w j,t + P j,t q j .
Recall that s 1 (ω) is increasing in ω. Hence, there exists ω t ∈ [0, 1] such that q 1,t (ω) ≥ 0 if and only if ω ≥ ω t and ω t = s 1 ( s 1,t ) −1 . Similarly, as s 2 (ω) is decreasing in ω, there exists ω t ∈ [0, 1] such that q 2,t (ω) ≥ 0 if and only if ω ≤ ω t and ω t = s 2 ( s 2,t ) −1 .
Uniform Pricing
Under uniform pricing, each variety ω has the same price in both cities. herefore, each seller has to choose whether to sell only in city 1, only in city 2, or in both locations. If the seller chooses to sell only in one location, the price function is the same as with lexible pricing. If he sells in both locations, the problem is
taking the demand functions 2 as given. he solution is
Individual prices are increasing in the taste preference s j regardless of whether a variety is sold in either one or both cities. his implies that in equilibrium there are thresholds s j,t such that in city j the consumption of variety ω is positive if and only if s j (ω) ≥ s j,t . Moreover, s 1 (ω) increasing implies that there exists ω t such that Ω 1,t = [
. Similarly, as s 2 (ω) is decreasing, then Ω 2,t = [0, ω t ]. As a result, the price of variety ω is
Finally, the thresholds are deined by 
uantitative Exploration
In this section we quantitatively evaluate the implications of uniform versus lexible pricing for irms and households.
Calibration
Given that our empirical evidence suggests uniform pricing, we calibrate the economy to the uniform pricing case in steady state. We assume cities are symmetric, so we normalize L 1 = L 2 = 1 and set q =q 1 =q 2 and z = z 1 = z 2 . Also, we set the taste parameters s 1 (ω) = (ω) α and s 2 (ω) = (1 − ω) α and we normalize the wage w 1 = w 2 = 1.
here are three parameters to calibrate: productivity z and the preference parameters α andq. We target three moments from the empirical results. First, in the data, 4% of stores sell only in one province. In the model, city 1 consumes varieties Ω 1 = [ω, 1] out of which varieties [ω, 1] are sold only in city 1. Hence, we target this moment as 0.04
Section 4.3 shows that prices of irms with a lower local share react less to regional shocks. In the model we deine the local share as local (ω) = q 1 (ω) / (q 1 (ω) + q 2 (ω)). We shock the economy with an exogenous increase in income for city 1-we increase L 1 by 1.7%, which corresponds to one standard deviation in the data. We target the response of a irm with a local share of 0.5 and the diferential efect between a irm with a local share of 1 versus one with 0.5. Despite its simplicity, the model does a good job at matching the three target moments. Table 8 shows the estimated parameters and target moments. Validation: We validate the calibration looking at price dispersion, which is a non-targeted moment. he total price dispersion (i.e., across varieties ω) is equal to 8.2% in the model. To map the dispersion to the data, we have to specify what chains, stores, and products are in the model. Depending on the mapping, the relevant price dispersion in the data can be as high as 9.7%. Our preferred interpretation is that each ω corresponds to a product in a chain for which there is one representative store in each city. Under this interpretation, the corresponding price dispersion in the data is equal to the chain plus the chain-product component of price dispersion in Argentina, which is equal to 5.89% (see Table 1 and the decomposition of Figure 3) . Note that the uniform-pricing model is very close to the data, while the lexible-pricing model predicts much higher price dispersion (44.27%).
Uniform versus Flexible Pricing
How do prices change across varieties? Focusing on city 1, products close to ω = 1 have a larger demand relative to products close to ω = 0. If sellers can set diferent prices across cities, then p 1 (ω) is monotonically increasing in ω (the red dashed line on the let panel of Figure 6 ). However, under uniform pricing, sellers have to set the same price in both cities. For those products very close to ω = 1, sellers prefer to set a relatively high price and sell only in city 1, while for most of the products they set an intermediate price such that there is positive demand in both markets. 19 Hence, price dispersion is smaller under uniform than lexible pricing.
he second panel of Figure 6 shows the quantity demanded of each variety in city 1. In the uniformpricing model, households do not consume goods below ω. Goods above ω are sold only in city 1 at a high price, so the quantity demanded is relatively small. Note that there is more dispersion across quantities in the uniform-than in the lexible-pricing model because there is less price dispersion across varieties. Notes: he irst igure shows the prices under uniform and lexible pricing. he second igure shows the quantity demanded in city 1. he third igure shows the response of prices to regional shocks in city 1. We shock the economy with an exogenous increase in income for city 1, we increase L 1 by 1.7%, which corresponds to one standard deviation in the data.
Response to regional shocks: In the calibration we target the response of prices to regional shocks for irms with a local share of 50% and 100%. We now compare the response for uniform versus lexible pricing. he third panel of Figure 6 shows the response of prices to income shocks as a function of the local share. In the economy with lexible pricing, the response of prices is equal to 0.47 for all varieties.
In the uniform pricing, economy irms have to set the same price across cities. Hence, when the local share is relatively small, the total demand for that product does not change much. As a result, the price has a small reaction to income shocks. On the other hand, when the local share is high, prices react more to income shocks in city 1. he paterns of price reactions in the uniform-pricing economy resemble the empirical indings of Figure 5 , while those in the lexible-pricing model do not.
Regional versus Aggregate Shocks
Prices react more to regional shocks under lexible than uniform pricing, providing consumers with a form of insurance and making them beter of. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the price index (deined as P index j,t such that w j,t L j,t = P index j,t ∫ 1 0 q jt (ω) dω) and individual prices for irms with local shares of 10%, 50%, or 90%. In the lexible-pricing economy, the response of individual prices is the same regardless of the local share. Under uniform pricing, the size of the response is increasing on the local share. he total efect is relected in the price index: Prices decrease more in the lexible-than in the uniform-pricing economy.
Aggregate shocks: Under uniform pricing, prices react more to aggregate than to regional shocks, which implies an smaller reaction of total consumption to aggregate than to regional shocks. Table  9 shows that the response of regional and aggregate shocks are the same with lexible pricing: Prices increase by 4.6% and consumption by 5.3% when household income increases by 10%. Under uniform pricing, however, prices react less to a regional than to an aggregate shock. Consumption, thus, reacts more to regional than to aggregate shocks. he estimated model predicts an almost one-third larger elasticity of consumption to a regional income shock than to an aggregate one. his result implies that using regional heterogeneity to infer aggregate elasticities may lead to an upward-bias due to uniform pricing. 
Winners and Losers: Steady-State Analysis
In this section we quantify the welfare gains of households and irms moving from uniform to lexible pricing.
How costly is the uniform-pricing constraint for irms?
Firms generally prefer the lexible-pricing model, but the gains are quite modest on average. he average proit under lexible pricing is 0.4% higher than under uniform pricing (second column of Table 10 ). he efect is, however, heterogeneous across irms and some irms prefer the uniform-pricing economy.
To understand this heterogeneity, we compute the change in proits for an individual irm ater we remove its uniform-pricing constraint but keep it for all other irms. he irm cannot be worse of because it can always set the same prices in both cities. More interestingly, the blue line of Figure 8 shows that those irms close to the thresholds ω and ω have the largest gains, with 4% higher proits. On the other hand, irms close to the corners of ω = 0 or ω = 1 or around ω = 0.5 have no gains. Intuitively, irms close to the corners sell only in one city under uniform pricing. When we remove the constraint, they start selling in the other city. he demand in the other city, however, is relatively small, so, despite entering a new market, proits do not increase much. Firms close to the middle have the same demand in both cities, so in equilibrium they choose to set the same prices and have no gains.
When all irms move to the lexible-pricing equilibrium, the gains can be diferent due to equilibrium efects. With our baseline calibration, we ind that gains are smaller for all irms (red doted line in Figure 8 ), particularly due to a reduction in the demand function. Taking into account equilibrium efects, some irms are actually worse of and prefer the uniform-pricing equilibrium to the lexible one. Notes: he igure shows the percentage increase in proits for a irm to move from uniform to lexible pricing both as an individual deivation and in the new equilibrium..
Do households prefer uniform or lexible pricing?
In the benchmark calibration, households prefer uniform pricing. his result, however, depends on the exact coniguration of the economy. here are four key forces at play, with diferent efects: competition, entry of new varieties, response to regional shocks, and city heterogeneity. First, competition stands for the fact that with uniform pricing, irms face more competition-in the form of heterogeneous demandswhich pushes down prices and makes households prefer uniform to lexible pricing. In the benchmark calibration this force is the strongest, so households prefer uniform pricing. Second, under lexible pricing there is entry of new varieties. hird, prices provide more insurance against regional shocks under lexible than uniform pricing. he second and third mechanisms make consumers beter of in the lexible-pricing economy. Fourth, if cities are heterogeneous (e.g., in income or size), results can go either way and be heterogeneous across households. As we show in Section 6.5, the total efect of these forces depends on the coniguration of the economy.
To evaluate the efect on households, we use the equivalent variation measure. We compute the change in household income such that the agent can atain the level of utility of the alternative economy under the prices of the uniform-pricing economy. hus, a negative value indicates that the household prefers uniform pricing to the alternative economy. he third row of Table 10 shows that the change in welfare of moving from uniform to lexible pricing is equivalent to an income reduction of 6.7%. he key force is the competition mechanism: For those goods for which city 1 has a relatively high taste, city 2 has a low taste. Hence, uniform pricing generates a force towards seting relatively low prices for those goods that agents value the most (recall the pricing choices of Figure 6 ). Uniform pricing acts as an increase in competition and makes consumers beter of. he size of this channel depends on many assumptions such as heterogeneity in tastes across cities.
In equilibrium, the demand function changes for two reasons. First, the budget constraint has to hold and, because preferences are non-homothetic, this changes the demand elasticity. Moreover, under lexible pricing there is entry of new varieties. We decompose the cost of moving to lexible pricing for these two efects. he irst row of Table 10 considers the case in which an individual irm can set diferent prices across cities. his exercise corresponds to a partial equilibrium in which we allow the irm to charge diferent prices but keep the demand function and set of products from the uniform pricing economy. For this counterfactual, the equivalent variation is −6.7%, almost the same as the total efect.
he second row of Table 10 shows the results when we keep the set of varieties constant but allow the demand function to adjust to the new equilibrium. In this case, the equivalent variation reduces by an additional 0.2% relative to the partial-equilibrium scenario. Finally, we interpret the diference between this result and the total efect (0.2%) as the welfare gains due to the entry of new varieties in the lexible-pricing equilibrium. Hence, the force of entry of new varieties is quite modest in the benchmark economy, while the efect of competition is larger and makes consumers beter of in the uniform-pricing economy.
Response to Regional Shocks: he total efect on household welfare depends on the volatility of regional shocks, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the discount factor. We estimate an AR(1) process for log L 1,t using the employment data from Section 4.3. We estimate a persistent parameter of 0.974 and a standard deviation of 0.021. We assume CRRA preferences u = c 1−σ 1−σ with σ = 2 and set the monthly discount factor β = 0.96 1/12 . he last row of Table 10 shows that relative to the steady state economy, the income equivalent has to be 0.4% higher. Hence, the business cycle adjustments of lexible pricing make consumers relatively beter of, but quantitatively the competition efect dominates in the baseline calibration. 20 Notes: he "Households" column computes the equivalent variation of moving from the uniform-pricing to the alternative economy. A negative value indicates that the household prefers the uniform-pricing economy. he "Firms" column computes the average proit gains for irms under the alternative economy.
Alternative City Conigurations
Do irms and households prefer the uniform-or lexible-pricing economy? he quantitative answer depends on several assumptions. In this section we consider alternative setups to study the quantitative importance of each assumption. We evaluate several cases: City 1 is poorer; city 1 is smaller; goods are homogeneous in city 2; volatility is higher; and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower. hese alternative assumptions mater for household preferences for uniform over lexible pricing but not so much for irms. he additional beneit of lexible pricing for households when taking into account regional shock depends mostly on the volatility of the shocks as well as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
City 1 is poor: When a city is poor, the value of lexible pricing increases for households in the poor city. We calibrate city 1 to be poorer than city 2. We set L 1 = 0.61, which corresponds to the income per capita of a province at the 25th percentile. Now households in city 1 prefer lexible pricing rather than uniform pricing, as in the benchmark scenario. he second row of Table 11 shows that the equivalent variation increases from −6.73% to 1.16% when we move away from symmetric cities. he intuition is that under uniform pricing, the seller takes into account the demand in city 2 and therefore sets relatively high prices. Instead, when they can price-discriminate across cities, prices in city 1 diminish and consumers are beter of.
City 1 is small: When a city is small, the value of uniform pricing increases for households in that city. We set the number of representative households to be M j and normalize M 1 + M 2 = 1. In the benchmark model we had set M 1 = M 2 = 0.5, while in this exercise we consider M 1 = 0.25. Under uniform pricing, sellers pay more atention to the demand in city 2 than city 1. Given the heterogeneity in preferences for goods across cities, the diference in city size will lead to even lower prices in the uniform-pricing economy than in the lexible one for the goods preferred by city 1. hus, the third row of Table 11 shows that the equivalent variation is reduced from −6.73% to −16.03%.
Homogeneous goods in city 2: When the two cities have more similar preferences, the value of uniform pricing is reduced. To study the role of product heterogeneity, we set s 2 (ω) = 1 while keeping s 1 (ω) = ω α . Hence, we have heterogeneous demand in city 1 but not in city 2. In this case the welfare gains of uniform pricing reduces to 3.06%. he intuition is that for products close to ω = 1, there is high demand in city 1 but not particularly low demand in city 2. Hence, in the uniform-pricing equilibrium, the prices of those goods will be higher than in the benchmark economy with s 2 (ω) = (1 − ω) α . As a result, the cost of moving to lexible pricing is lower.
Higher volatility: he additional value of lexible pricing increases with the volatility of the shocks. When we double the volatility, the additional value of lexible prices due to business cycles increases by a factor of three (from 0.44 to 1.31). Recall that with lexible pricing, prices are more procyclical, hence providing more insurance to consumers. Hence, when the volatility increases, so do the gains from this channel. However, note that even if we duplicate the volatility of the shocks, the net efect is still negative: Consumers prefer uniform pricing, and the total income equivalent is −5.42.
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution: When agents have a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution, they put more value on smoothing consumption and, hence, increase the value of lexible pricing. If we set σ = 10, the additional value of lexible pricing increases to 1.28. Again, note that this increase is not enough to overcome the steady-state efects and the total efect remains negative. Notes: City 1 poor has L 1 = 0.61. City 1 small has M 1 = 0.25 and M 2 = 0.75. When goods are homogeneous in city 2, we assume s 2 (ω) = 1. With higher volatility, we duplicate the volatility of regional shocks. With Lower IES, we set σ = 10.
General Equilibrium
We compare the lexible-and uniform-pricing economies when there is endogenous labor supply, labor markets clear, and households of each city are the owners of irms. he representative household of
where L S j,t is the labor supply and h j,t are the eiciency units. he agent consumes C j,t -a bundle of varieties ω-with price P C,j,t . he representative household in city j is the owner of Π j,t ; i.e., irms' proits in city j
he demand for variety ω is similar to equation 2 with total income equal to y j,t = w j,t L S j,t h j,t + Π j,t . Labor market: Labor demand and supply are
( w j,t h j,t ζ P C,j,t ) 1/γ and the wage w j,t clears the labor market.
Results: We set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/γ to 1 (as in Kaplan, Moll, and Violante 2018 or Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten 2016) , the weight on the labor supply component of utility, ζ , is set so that hours worked are equal to one-third in steady state, and calibrate the same parameters as before (productivity z, and preference parametersq, and α) to match the same target moments as in the previous calibration. 21 Table 12 compares the solutions under uniform and lexible pricing.
Proits are higher under lexible than uniform pricing, as in partial equilibrium, but now there are feedbacks to households' income due to general-equilibrium efects. In partial equilibrium, irms are beter of under lexible than uniform pricing because they are less constrained. Table 12 shows that this force is also present in general equilibrium: Proits are slightly higher (about 0.7%) under lexible pricing. In general equilibrium, the representative household is the owner of irms' local proits. Hence, the proits component of households' income is higher under lexible pricing which increases the total income of households.
Households prefer uniform pricing, as in partial equilibrium, but are willing to give up less income 21 To compute the response to local shocks we introduce shocks to local eiciency units h j,t .
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to avoid lexible pricing under general equilibrium. he equivalent variation goes down from 6.7% in partial equilibrium to 0.9% in general equilibrium. he main reason is that the representative household is also the owner of proits which are higher in the lexible-pricing economy. his result hinges on the assumption of how proits are distributed across households. In a model with household heterogeneity in ownership shares, we expect households with low ownership shares will be willing to give up more income to avoid lexible pricing than those with high ownership shares. 
Conclusion
his paper introduces a new database of grocery prices in Argentina, with over 9 million observations per day, to study the importance of chains relative to stores for prices. We show that conditional on a product, there is litle variation across stores of the same chain; i.e., there is uniform pricing. Prices almost do not vary within stores of a chain and prices do not change signiicantly with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so for chains that operate in many regions.
Using a simple two-region model, we show that uniform pricing has non-trivial implications for irms' proits and consumers' welfare. Relative to a counterfactual in which irms can set diferent prices across regions (i.e., lexible pricing), uniform pricing reduces irms' proits by 0.7%. Consumers, however, prefer uniform pricing and are willing to give up 3.8% of their income to avoid lexible pricing in the baseline model. he efect on consumers, however, depends on how much uniform pricing limits irms' power to extract consumer surplus and how heterogeneous the regions are.
he model also has relevant implications for consumption inequality when chains operate in multiple locations with heterogeneous levels of income or locations subject to local shocks. Under uniform pricing, chains set prices as if they have a consumer with an income equal to a weighted average of the two regions' income, hence leading to higher (lower) prices for the poor (rich) location than under lexible pricing. Following this same line of thought, negative local income shocks would lead to smaller price reductions when there can be only one price for multiple regions, thus leading to a larger decrease in consumption under uniform than lexible pricing. We interpret this inding to mean that the efect of regional business cycles on consumption may be ampliied by uniform pricing.
Why would irms set uniform prices instead of customizing prices to local customers? Traditional explanations typically focus on the cost of discriminating, including operation as well as reputation costs. Dobson and Waterson (2008) provide a diferent reason more closely related to collusion. hey show that irms may be beter of under uniform pricing even if they have larger market power in some regions. his policy, if applied by all irms under commitment, will soten competition in other markets and may suiciently raise irm proits overall (at the cost of some local proits). Our paper does not explore this question. Instead, using the model, we take uniform pricing as an exogenous constraint and evaluate its consequences for consumers and irms. We highlight, nevertheless, that the returns to price discrimination for irms in our baseline estimation are low, less than 2% of proits on average. Hence, we interpret this to mean that the costs of price discrimination may not need to be as large as one may imagine to justify uniform pricing.
A Data Appendix A.1 Website Example Figure A1 shows an example in which this website is used to search for Coca-Cola soda. he second igure shows that ater searching for Coca-Cola, many varieties of the product are available. he prices in the nearby stores are reported. Ater selecting one particular product (e.g., Gaseosa Coca-Cola X 2,25Lt), we obtain the list of stores and their prices. Note that these prices include list and sale prices.
35 Figure A1 : Precios Claros Website
Step 1: Introduce Location
Step 2: Search for Product
Step 3: Select Product Notes: We show here an example in which the website is used to search for Coke (Coca-Cola) soda. he last igure shows (a subset of) the diferent stores and prices (including sales) available nearby. 
B Statistical Model of Price Dispersion
We use a statistical model to do a variance decomposition of prices and formally highlight the role of chains behind price seting. We implement this analysis separately for each day, so the variation studied here is not related to prices changing over time-and we do not need to control for time factors. We then report average results over time as well as the autocorrelation of the diferent estimated components.
We propose that the log-price p д,s,c , of good д in store s of chain c, can be summarized by a product ixedefect α д , a chain ixed-efect β c , a chain-product ixed-efect γ д,c , and a residual ϵ д,s,c . he variation in ϵ д,s,c comes from diferent stores of the same chain seting diferent prices for the same product:
In our estimation, we assume that the conditional mean E [
, such that α д absorbs the average price efect. his standardizes prices, facilitating the comparison of prices of diferent goods that may be more expensive due to their characteristics (e.g., a 2.25 liter botle of a particular soda vs a 750 milliliter botle of a shampoo). 22 We also assume that E [ γ д,c |c ] = 0, such that β c absorbs the average chain efect. his controls for some chains being on average more expensive, possibly due to their particular amenities. hese assumptions simplify the estimation, which is particularly important given the size of our sample and guarantee that covariance terms are zero. he estimation of α д , β c , and γ д,c can be done by conditional sample means:
where (with a slight abuse of notation) N д refers to the number of stores selling good д, N c the number of price observations (i.e., good-stores) of chain c, and N д,c the number of stores selling good д in chain c.
We then abstract from the price variation due to product characteristics α д and study dispersion in relative prices. We decompose relative price variation in a chain component, a chain-product component, and the residual:
22 his is equivalent to analyzing "relative prices, " as in Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (Forthcoming) . Figure 3 in the main text shows that in CABA 15% of the price variation is driven by some chains being generally more expensive than others. Once we control for average prices of products by chains, 73% (15% + 58%) of the price dispersion is explained. For the Argentinean case, we also estimate the importance of prices in chains at the province-product level. In this case, average chain prices per product explain 62% (10% + 52%) of price variation. Controlling for price diferences across provinces by chain explains another 19%. In other words, consistent with Tables 2 and 3 , price variation across stores within chains is small, driving only 27% and 19% of the total relative price dispersion for CABA and Argentina, respectively.
Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Neumeyer (2018) estimate price dispersion in Argentina using a longer time series of price data from 1988 to 1997, covering a range of monthly inlation between 0 and 200%. hey have, however, only 500 products that cannot be precisely compared across stores (since products are deined as narrow categories and don't have bar codes). Our dataset contains a substantially larger number of goods that can be precisely compared across stores since we observe their UPC bar code. Our estimates for the standard deviation of relative prices is approximately 7% and 10% for CABA and Argentina, respectively. hese estimates are near but below the estimates reported by Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Neumeyer (2018) in periods with inlation levels close to the ones from our time period. One potential explanation for this diference is that we are actually comparing the same products (UPC bar code) across stores, while they may be comparing diferent products.
Autocorrelation: Understanding the origin of this price dispersion is important to understanding store price seting as well as consumer choices. Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (Forthcoming) highlight that a large share of price dispersion comes from each store selling diferent sets of goods cheaper while charging similar prices on average. his situation suggests that an information problem might make consumers buy in a store selling goods more at higher prices since it is costly (or not possible) to ind lower prices. If chains are the only drivers of price dispersion, the information problem seems more limited, as long as price diferences between chains are persistent. Figure B3 shows the autocorrelation of the estimated componentsβ c ,γ д,c , andε д,s,c at diferent lags of days. 
C Model Appendix
In this appendix we derive the solution of the model.
C.1 Household's problem
he irst-order condition reads s j (ω) q j,t (ω) +q j ≤ λ j,t p j,t (ω)
,where λ j,t is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. Hence, the demand for varieties with positive consumption is q j,t (ω) = s j (ω) λ j,t p j,t (ω) −q j .
i. Solve for s : . ii. In j = 1, we have that
iii. In j = 2, we have that is close enough to P new 1 , P new 2 .
C.4 General Equilibrium: Algorithm
For each city j we have 4 unknowns: (i) the threshold for the set of products, (ii) he average price of varieties, (iii) the real wage, (iv) and the total proits. In the lexible pricing economy the equilibrium of each city is solved independently while in the uniform price economy the 8 unknowns are solve simultaneously. Below we describe the extended algorithm to solve the equilibrium.
1. Normalize w 1 = w 2 = 1.
2. Initiate guess P 3. Given the guess of real wage solve for labor supply.
4. Apply algorithms C.2.1 or C.3.1 (depending on lexible or uniform pricing) and obtain labor demand and total proits in each city.
5. Use excess supply on labor market and diference in total proits in each city to get P 
